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Abstract:  This paper investigates the impact of tax policy on international depositing. 
Non-bank international deposits are shown to be positively related to interest income  
taxes  and  to  the  presence  of  domestic  bank  interest  reporting.  This  suggests  that 
international deposits are in part intended to facilitate tax evasion. At present, only part of 
international interest flow are covered by either non-resident interest withholding taxes or 
international exchange of information. This incomplete coverage may be a reason that 
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1 .  Introduction 
Countries typically tax the worldwide interest income of their residents. By now, 
the tax authorities in most OECD countries require domestic banks to report interest 
payments to domestic residents. In contrast, no comprehensive system of international 
exchange of bank interest information exists to date. This, combined with the generally 
low  taxation  of  international  bank  interest  at  source,  implies  that  the  international 
recipient of bank interest can evade all taxation of this income with relative ease.  
In the minds of European policy makers, this has been a serious problem since at 
least  the  1980s,  as  evidenced  by  the  introduction  in  1989  of  a  first  proposal  for  a 
European directive towards a common minimum withholding tax on interest. In 1998, a 
second proposal for a directive was published that gave EU member states the option to 
tax interest accruing to non-residents at source or to exchange information with other 
countries. In November 2001,  EU finance ministers abandoned the idea of co-existing 
withholding taxes and information exchange, and instead stated their intention to move 
towards generalized information exchange by 2010. Until then, several countries, namely 
Austria,  Belgium  and  Luxembourg,  will  be  free  to  levy  a  minimum  withholding  tax 
instead, with the understanding that 75 percent of the tax revenues are passed on to the 
residence-country  tax  authorities.  These  intended  policies  have  been  laid  down  in  a 
proposal for a directive in July 2001
1.  
  The adoption of a directive in the area of international interest taxation would be 
the first major international agreement in the area of capital income taxation, or for that 
matter of direct taxation in general. The further development of policy in this area (to 
include, say, countries outside the EU, or to extend coverage to dividends) is hampered 
by a lack of empirical analysis of international interest tax evasion.  A main impediment 
to research in this area has been the limited data on the international ownership of bank 
deposits and other financial assets. Countries are presumably restricting access to these 
                                                           
1 See European Commission (2001).  A stated condition for the adoption of this directive is that 
the European Union reaches agreement with several third countries, notably Switzerland, to institute similar 
anti-evasion measures in these countries.  
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data  to  protect  the  employment  and  profits  of  their  domestic  banking  sectors.
2  More 
discussion at the international level of the potential roles of banks in tax evasion and 
money laundering schemes may some day force more openness, but for now data on 
bilateral banking flows remain confidential. Data of this kind, however, are collected by 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and have been made available for this study 
on the condition that data on bilateral banking flows are not disclosed.  
  The main purpose of this paper is to see to what extent international banking 
flows reflect tax policy and efforts to enforce it. Tax determinants first are the residence-
based interest income and wealth taxes that de jure typically apply to worldwide income 
and wealth. To aid enforcement, many countries by now require their banks to report 
interest payments to domestic residents to the tax authorities. To enable international 
enforcement, banking countries in some instances also supply information to foreign tax 
authorities.  Data on  both  types  of  information  provision  have  been  collected for  this 
study. Finally, the analysis also takes into account that international interest payments 
may be subject to an interest withholding tax in the source country.  
Our  empirical  results  suggest  that  interest  income  taxation  has  encouraged 
international  depositing,  at  least  during  the  high-interest-rate  period  of  the  1980s. 
Domestic  bank  interest  reporting  also  appears  to  contribute  to  international  bank 
placements.  There  is  less  evidence  that  interest  withholding  taxes  discourage  such 
depositing, perhaps because non-resident withholding taxes are typically rather low and 
imposed by relatively few countries. Similarly, there is little evidence that international 
information  exchange  –  for  1999  data  –  has  a  strong  impact  on  bilateral  depositing. 
Again, a reason may be the haphazard pattern of international information exchange at 
present. Truly generalized withholding taxes or information exchange in principle affect 
the international depositing decision as much as domestic tax policy, and hence can be 
expected to have a significant impact on international depositing patterns. 
Several  authors  have  previously  examined  the  determinants  of  international 
banking  flows.  Grilli  (1989)  relates  non-bank  and  inter-bank  deposits  to  interest  and 
                                                           
2   Countries with relatively few internationally active banks may in addition see a need to retain 
information in order to maintain the confidentiality of bank-level information. Countries may originally 
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dividend taxes, capital flows, an index of bank secrecy, GNP, and a trend. He finds that 
non-bank deposits are influenced by taxes on interest and by bank secrecy, while inter-
bank  deposits  are  driven  by  the  size  of  the  source  economy  and  by  the  taxation  of 
dividends (suggesting that bank accounts might be used to park money meant for later 
financial transactions). Alworth and Andresen (1992) further estimate a gravity model to 
explain  the  determinants  of  non-bank  bilateral  deposit  flows  using  data  up  to  1990.
3 
These authors include several bank-system variables such as the (bilateral) difference in 
reserve requirements, the bank-country interest withholding tax, and an index of its bank 
secrecy. The withholding tax and bank secrecy variables, as part of interacted variables, 
are shown to be determinants of cross-border deposits. More recently, Fornari and Levy 
(2000) have estimated the determinants of bilateral cross-border deposit inflows for a 
group of 6 industrialized countries. These authors place special emphasis on financial 
structure variables such the stock market capitalization to GDP, stock market volatility 
differences and the trading volume of the stock market.  
As Alworth and Andresen (1992), the present paper examines the determinants of  
bilateral international depositing with a focus on taxation. This paper differs, however, in 
that we have somewhat more detailed information on the tax regime and the availability 
of bank information to tax authorities. In particular, the present paper includes personal 
interest  income  and  wealth  taxes  and  distinguishes  between  the  domestic  and 
international availability of bank information to tax authorities. 
  Several theoretical papers have also examined tax policy towards mobile financial 
capital.  Janeba  and  Peters  (1999),  for  instance,  consider  the  issue  of  discrimination 
against internationally mobile capital given that countries set tax rates non-cooperatively. 
Huizinga and Nielsen (2000) show that an internationally agreed minimum withholding 
                                                                                                                                                                               
have  started  to  collect  this  information  to  monitor  monetary  developments  rather  than  to  check  the 
competitive positions of their banking sectors. 
3   Recently several papers have also applied the gravity approach to investigate capital flows other 
than  cross-border  deposits.  Portes  and  Rey  (1999),  for  instance,  show  that  bilateral  portfolio  equity 
investments reflect variables proxying (private) information availability, such as international telephone 
calls and multinational bank branches. Along similar lines, Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2000) find that 
U.S. holdings of a country’s equities are positively related to the share of that country’s stock market that is 
listed on U.S. exchanges. This is attributed to the fact that a listing in the U.S. lowers information costs for 
U.S. investors. 
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tax on interest, that is only binding for a small country, can benefit all countries, if in fact 
all  countries  are  induced  to  increase  their  interest  tax  rates.  Bacchetta  and  Espinosa 
(1995) argue that it may be in a country’s own interest to provide information about bank 
interest  payments  to  non-residents,  as  this  enables  the  interest-receiving  country  to 
increase its own income tax rate. This in turn reduces the incentive for residents of the 
information-providing  country  to  place  their  savings  abroad.  In  a  repeated  game 
framework, Bacchetta and Espinoza (2000) further study the joint determination of taxes 
on international investment income and information-exchange clauses in double taxation 
treaties. They find that information exchange may be part of a (sustainable) tax treaty if 
there is a reciprocity requirement, when there is a high cost of negotiation, or with one-
way capital flows. Also in a repeated game setting, Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) examine 
countries’  exclusive  choice  between  non-resident  withholding  taxes  and  information 
exchange (as provided for by the European Commission’s draft directive of 1998, see 
European  Commission  (1998)).  Two  countries  choosing  the  same  regime  (either 
withholding taxes or information exchange) and a mixed regime (one country choosing 
withholding taxes and the other information exchange) are all possible equilibria of the 
regime selection game. Information exchange performs relatively well, and is more likely 
to be chosen in equilibrium, if governments apply a relatively low discount rate to future 
outcomes. In the following, section 2 discusses the data used in this study. Section 3 
presents the empirical results, and section 4 concludes. 
 
2.   The data 
2.1  International deposits 
  The BIS has collected data on the external liabilities of reporting country banking 
systems since 1983, and on external deposits from 1996 onwards
4. The external liabilities 
and deposits of BIS reporting countries for 1999 are reported in Table 1. These figures 
represent all currencies. From the table, we see that the UK and the US have the largest 
                                                           
4   External  deposits  comprise  all  claims  by  non-residents  on  banks  and  bank-like  reporting 
institutions with evidence of deposit not in the form of negotiable securities. Apart from external deposits, 
external liabilities include marketable instruments such as negotiable debt securities, bonds and short-term 
negotiable  instruments,  derivative  instruments  on-balance  sheet,  and  working  capital.  See  Bank  for 
International Settlements (2000b).    6 
external liabilities at ￿ 1.8 trillion and ￿ 1.0 trillion, respectively. Among the smaller 
countries, the Cayman Islands and Switzerland have about ￿ 0.6 trillion foreign liabilities, 
while Luxembourg has around ￿ 0.4 trillion. The total external liabilities of banks in the 
BIS area amount to ￿ 9.0 trillion. Total liabilities are divided between bank and non-bank 
liabilities. Bank liabilities are debts to other banks, and non-bank liabilities are debts to 
individuals, public institutions and to businesses.
5 As seen in the second column, non-
bank liabilities are less than half of total liabilities in all reporting countries. For the BIS 
area, non-bank liabilities stand at 24 percent of total liabilities. Interestingly, non-bank 
liabilities are highest in Switzerland and the Cayman Islands at 48 and 42 percent of total 
liabilities, respectively. External deposits are represented in the third column. External 
deposits are shown to be the lion’s share of external liabilities.
6 For the BIS area as a 
whole, external deposits are 92 percent of external liabilities. The last column indicates 
that non-bank external deposits are 25 percent of total external deposits. 
  It is also interesting to consider to what extent a country’s residents maintain 
deposits abroad. To proceed, let dij be the non-bank deposits in country i owned by the 
residents of country j (with i different from j). We can now define country j’s exports of 
non-bank deposits (as part of capital exports) or  Ej, and  country i’s  imports (as part of 
capital imports) or Ii as follows,  
    Ej  = ￿
¹ j i
ij d                                    Ii  = ￿
¹i j
ij d  
To see how important these non-bank deposit exports and imports are, we can 
relate them to the total Non-bank  deposits in a country’s  banking system and to the 
worldwide ownership of non-bank deposits by a country’s residents. Specifically, let Di 
be the total non-bank deposits in country i’s banking system. The worldwide ownership 
of non-bank deposits by residents of country i then can be defined as Oi = Di + Ei – Ii . 
The share of non-bank deposits owned by residents of country i held abroad is given by 
                                                           
5   These businesses include non-bank financial institutions such as mutual funds, hedge funds, and 
insurance companies. 
6   Note that not all countries report separate data for external liabilities and deposits on a country 
basis. In the last several years, the rapid growth in external bank liabilities has resulted in a larger share of 
external bank liabilities in total external liabilities. 
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i s =  i i O E / . Net deposit imports cause a country’s banking system to be larger than it 
would otherwise be. We can define the expansion ratio of a country’s banking system on 
account  of  its  net  non-bank  deposit  imports  as  i g =  i i i O E I / ) ( - .  This  expansion  is 
measured  relative  to  the  hypothetical  case  where  the  banking  system  exactly 
accommodates the non-bank deposits owned by the country’s residents. The expansion 
ratio is a rough index of how much a particular banking system gains or loses on account 
of its net non-bank deposit imports. 
  Table 2 provides data on aggregate deposit exports and imports and other derived 
variables for 1998.
7 Switzerland and the United Kingdom are shown to be net exporters 
of deposits (bank and non-bank deposits together) from the first 2 columns, while they 
are net importers of non-bank deposits from the 2 next columns. Net inflows of non-bank 
deposits  thus  are  more  than  off-set  by  net  outflows  of  bank  deposits.  At  any  rate, 
incoming  non-bank  deposits  are  recycled  as  outgoing  bank  deposits.  Conversely,  the 
United States is a net exporter of non-bank deposits, and a net importer of bank deposits 
(as net exports of non-bank deposits exceed net exports of overall deposits). Other net 
exporters of non-bank deposits are Australia, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, and Spain.  
  Next, we turn to the share of non-bank deposits owned by residents held abroad. 
Ireland  leads  here  with  33  percent,  reflecting  its  relatively  high  exports  of  non-bank 
deposits. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland and Norway instead have foreign shares 
of total non-bank deposit ownership at less than 5 percent, indicating relatively closed 
banking systems. Finally, we consider the expansion rate of the banking system due to 
net non-bank deposit imports. Switzerland is shown to be a large net non-bank deposit 
importer, and correspondingly is calculated to have a banking expansion rate of 19%. The 
United States and Spain, in contrast, display relatively large banking sector ' contractions'  
on  account  of  large  net  non-bank  deposit  exports.  To  increase  the  national  coverage 
somewhat, Table 3 provides information on exports and imports of bank liabilities rather 
than  bank  deposits.  Hong  Kong  registers  as  an  additional  net  exporter  of  non-bank 
liabilities, while the Bahamas is shown to be a strong net importer of non-bank liabilities. 
                                                           
7   We chose 1998 as the total non-bank banking system deposits published for 1999 by euro-area 
countries include shares in money market funds.   8 
 
2.2  The tax system 
  Countries typically tax different types or income at different rates. Since 1983, 
increasingly many countries have opted for dual tax systems with different tax rates for 
earned and capital income. Capital income may again be taxed differently depending on 
whether it takes the form of interest, dividends, or capital gains. In practice, even finer 
gradations are found (especially with respect to international capital income flows) where 
separate rates of tax are applied to bond interest, bank interest, or interest from a loan 
secured by real estate. Wealth taxes tend to be less specific, although some countries 
make  distinctions  between  taxes  on  financial  wealth  (which  could  be  divided  into 
portfolio wealth or business ownership), and real estate. Throughout, we have attempted 
to identify the taxation of interest from deposits and wealth in the form of deposits as 
regards individuals.  
  Table 4 provides the effective interest income and wealth taxes applied to bank 
deposits  in  1999  in  most  BIS  reporting  countries.  Both  taxes  generally  apply  to 
worldwide interest income and wealth, and take into account sub-national taxation of 
interest  in  several  cases,  such  as  Canada  and  Denmark.  In  1999,  Austria,  Belgium, 
Finland,  France,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Portugal,  Sweden,  and  the  United 
Kingdom maintained dual (or multiple) income tax systems with a relatively low tax rate 
for interest income. In most cases, the dual income tax system was introduced during the 
1983-1999 period, with a view to discourage tax evasion and to lower compliance costs. 
These introductions were probably at least in part meant to reduce the incentive to evade 
the taxation of domestic capital income such as interest income
8. Since 1983, the average 
statutory interest income tax has declined gradually, as seen in Figure 1. Deposit interest 
rates have declined as well, and hence the interest tax burden expressed as a percentage 
of principal (and calculated as the statutory interest rate times the deposit interest rate) 
has declined even more, as also seen in Figure 1. 
                                                           
8   Recent tax reforms continue the movement away from synthetic income tax systems. At the start 
of 2001, the Netherlands also introduced a dual system with a tax rate of 30 percent on a (deemed) return 
on capital income of 4 percent. This amounts to a wealth tax of 1.2 percent per annum to replace the 
previous wealth tax of 0.7 percent.   9 
  Table 4 also provides information about wealth taxes in place in 1999. These 
annually assessed wealth taxes exclude taxes on intergenerational transfers such as estate 
taxes. Since 1983, several countries have eliminated their regular wealth taxes (Austria’s 
ended by 1994, Denmark’s by 1997, and Germany’s by 1997). France relinquished its 
‘old’ wealth tax by 1986, to introduce a ‘new’ wealth tax in 1988. Overall, the average 
wealth tax has declined significantly since 1983 (see Figure 2). Finally, we turn to non-
resident interest withholding taxes
9. In 1999, only 4 countries, namely Australia, Japan, 
Portugal, and Switzerland, levy positive withholding taxes on any outgoing bank interest 
flows, as seen in the table. In several instances, interest paid by banks has been taxed at 
lower non-resident withholding tax rates than other interest. The U.S., for instance, has 
maintained  a  statutory  exemption  for  bank  interest  throughout  the  period  under 
consideration, even though it levied a non-resident (non-treaty) interest withholding tax 
of 30 applied to bond interest up to 1984. The U.K. similarly exempts bank interest on 
bank claims with a maturity of less than a year including regular current account and 
savings account deposits. Switzerland is a major financial center that continues to tax the 
bank interest accruing to non-residents, even though this country has also reduced the 
non-treaty tax rate of 35 percent to 12.5 percent or less in all but 5 cases
10. Austria and 
France are among the countries that have abolished non-resident withholding taxes in 
1993  and  1997,  respectively.  Overall,  the  average  statutory  non-resident  interest 
withholding tax has declined since 1983, as seen in Figure 3. The withholding tax burden, 
as a percentage of principal, has diminished even more, reflecting the decline in deposit 
interest rates. 
 
2.3  Access to bank information and international information exchange 
Taxes  on  bank  interest  that  are  not  withheld  by  the  paying  bank  have  to  be 
collected from the depositor. To make enforcement in this case realistic, the tax authority 
                                                           
9   See also Zee (1998) for an exposition of the role of withholding taxes in taxing international 
portfolio income. 
10   In the case of Switzerland, many deposits are held in fiduciary accounts that de jure are inter-bank 
accounts not subject to withholding taxation, even if the ultimate beneficiaries are individuals. 
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needs to have independent access to bank information. Access to bank information for tax 
purposes,  either  domestic  or  international,  has  been  far  from  straightforward,  as 
documented in a comprehensive recent report by the OECD (2000).
11 A first requirement 
is that the banks themselves maintain the information that is required for tax enforcement 
and that they do not open anonymous or numbered accounts. As indicated by OECD 
(2000), the vast majority of OECD tax authorities can obtain bank information to combat 
domestic tax evasion. Information provision – either domestic or international – can be 
categorized as spontaneous (on the initiative of the information provider), on request, or 
automatic. Tax authorities that request specific account information have to follow due 
procedures – administrative or legal – to make the request. To make specific requests, tax 
authorities need to already have some specific information on which to base the request. 
Information  provided  on  request  is  thus  not  likely  to  lead  to  across-the-board  tax 
enforcement.  
This leaves the automatic and periodic provision of bank information as the only 
viable  way  to  enforce  taxation.  As  seen  in  OECD  (2000,  Appendix  1),  15  OECD 
countries require their banks to generally report ‘interest paid and to whom it is paid’.
12 
These countries were requested to indicate when they started to require their domestic 
banks  to  automatically  report  interest  payments  to  domestic  residents.  The  answers 
received are reflected in Table 5. As seen in the table, during the 1980s and early 1990s 
several countries additionally required domestic interest reporting. By 1999 about two 
thirds of the countries required automatic domestic information provisioning regarding 
interest payments.  
  International automatic information exchange requires some international legal 
agreement – in addition to domestic regulation. The legal basis can be a bilateral tax 
treaty, which in many cases is modeled after the OECD Model Convention on Income 
and Capital
13. Article 26 of this convention requires contracting States to ‘exchange such 
                                                           
11   The  OECD’s  work  to  promote  exchange  of  information,  as  reflected  in  this  report,  has  been 
motivated by a drive against money laundering as much as by a desire to counteract tax evasion. 
12   Frequently other information, for instance on account balances or on securities held in custody, is 
exchanged as well. 
13   In April 2002, the OECD released a new model for (non-binding) bilateral agreements concerning 
the effective exchange of information in tax matters, following the work of the Global Forum Working 
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information as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Convention or of the 
domestic laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes covered by the Convention 
insofar as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention’. All OECD members 
except  Luxembourg  and  Switzerland  can  obtain  bank  information  for  the  purpose  of 
exchange of information under tax treaties as set out in the Model Convention.
14 Several 
multilateral agreements that can serve as a basis for information exchange exist as well. 
For instance, the European Union has  adopted several directives that enable member 
states to exchange information within the EU on direct and indirect tax matters.
15 The 
joint  OECD/Council  of  Europe  Multilateral  Convention  on  Mutual  Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters, which has been ratified by 8 countries (Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, United States), also permits countries 
to  exchange  information  on  direct  and  indirect  tax  matters.  Finally,  the  Nordic 
Convention  on  Mutual  Administrative  Assistance  in  Tax  Matters  allows  the  Nordic 
countries to exchange bank and other information for all kinds of taxes except import 
duties.  Unlike  the  other  multilateral  agreements,  the  Nordic  Convention  calls  for  the 
automatic exchange of bank information.  
  In its survey, the OECD found that 11 members (Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, the United 
States) provided bank information automatically to (some) treaty partners.  We  requested 
these countries to provide additional information about their recipient countries and the 
history of this automatic information exchange. The resulting data about the history of 
bilateral  information  exchange  are  also  summarized  in  Table  5.  Several  countries 
(Australia, Finland, and Norway) mentioned their treaty partners as recipients, but more 
generally countries supply information automatically to a more selective and changing 
list of countries. The OECD report mentions that Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Group on Effective Exchange of Information (including several OECD members and Aruba, Bermuda, 
Bahrain,  Cayman  Islands,  Cyprus,  the  Isle  of  Man,  Malta,  Mauritius,  the  Netherlands  Antilles,  the 
Seychelles and San Marino). 
14   Countries that agree to exchange information automatically typically do not write this into their 
bilateral tax treaty, but instead conclude a separate memorandum of understanding. 
15   In  particular,  see  directives  77/799/EEC,  79/1070/EEC,  92/12/EEC,  and  the  recent  proposal 
COM(2001)294. 
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Norway  and  Sweden  exchange  bank  information  automatically  based  in  part  on 
reciprocity.  As  recipient  lists  of  countries  vary  from  year  to  year  and  institutional 
memories are short, it is impossible to construct an accurate history of bilateral automatic 
information exchange.  
On the basis of survey responses, however, one can get a relatively complete 
picture of automatic information exchange in the BIS-area for 1999 (see Table 6). From 
the table, we can see to what extent information exchange in practice occurs on the basis 
of reciprocity. Specifically, in the table there are 288 unidirectional entries for which we 
also know whether information flows in the other direction. Of these, 67 entries signal the 
presence  of  international  information  exchange.  Of  these  67  entries,  30  one-way 
exchanges are reciprocated (i.e. there are 15 pairs of bilateral information exchange). To 
measure  the  degree  of  reciprocity,  we  constructed  2  dummy  variables  for  our  288 
observations  flagging  whether  information  was  sent  and  received.  The  correlation 
coefficient between these two dummy variables is found to be 0.28 and to be significant 
at the one percent level. This is evidence of reciprocity of information exchange.  
  A  separate  issue  is  whether  information  exchange  and  withholding  taxes  are 
complements or substitutes. To investigate this, we note that there are 440 entries for 
which  we  know  whether  there  is  information  exchange  as  well  as  the  relevant 
withholding tax rate. Breaking down these 440 entries, we find there are 68 entries with 
only information exchange, 51 entries with only a withholding tax, 17 entries with both, 
and finally 304 entries with neither. The 17 entries with joint information exchange and 
withholding taxation all pertain to Australia (as a bank country). Apart from Australia, 
information  exchange  and  withholding  taxes  thus  are  substitutes  rather  than 
complements. 
 
2.4  Other data 
  The empirical work below combines the bank liability and tax policy variables 
with various controls at the level of the individual country and of the bilateral relationship 
between  any  two  countries.  National  controls  are  real  GDP,  the  bank  interest  spread 
(defined as the ratio of the lending and deposit interest rates), an index of the rule of law, 
and indices of legal system origin. Controls at the bilateral level are trade flows (in both   13
directions),  the  distance  between  the  two  countries,  and  an  index  of  geographical 
contiguity and of a common language. Variables of this type regularly appear in gravity-
type regressions explaining trade or financial flows. Summary statistics of all the data 
used in this study are provided in Table 7. The data in the table are for 1999 given that 
this year is common to all estimation below. The tax variables in the table, as in the 
empirical work, are in the form of tax burdens expressed as percentages of the principal. 
Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Appendix A. 
 
3 .  Empirical results 
  This  section  examines  the  empirical  relationship  between  tax  policy  and  the 
external liabilities of the banking system. As our main interest is in tax policy at the 
personal level, we mainly consider non-bank liabilities and deposits. Following Alworth 
and  Andresen  (1992),  we  use  BIS  data  on  bilateral  external  liabilities  and  deposits. 
Bilateral  data  are  preferred  as  this  allows  us  to  include  tax  and  other  information 
concerning the bank country, the customer country and their bilateral relationship. The 
analysis starts from the following estimating  equation: 
 
ijt ijt ij jt j it i ijt X X X I e b b b a + + + + =  
 
where Iijt is the dependent variable denoting funds held in country i’s banks by  residents 
of country j (e.g., non-bank external liabilities or non-bank external deposits); next, Xit 
are bank country variables (e.g., real GDP), Xjt are customer country variables (e.g., the 
wealth tax), and Xijt are characteristics of the bilateral relationship between the bank and 
the  customer  countries  (e.g.,  distance).  The  vector  Xit  only  contains  non-tax-policy 
controls, while the vectors Xjt  and Xijt contain tax policy variables as well as controls. 
Further, a is a constant,  the b' s are vectors of coefficients, and eijt is an error term. All 
regressions  in  addition  include  time  dummies,  while  some  regressions  also  contain 
country dummies for bank and customer countries alike. 
  The  variable  Iijt  reflects  an  equilibrium  value  in  a  country’s  external  liability 
market. We consider that banks can operate freely in the international interbank deposit 
market, and can obtain funds inelastically at an exogenously given international interbank   14
rate. One reason for this is that the banks themselves generally are not subject to interest 
withholding taxes. Changes in tax policy then affect Iijt through their effect on the risk 
and  after-tax  return  associated  with  deposits  in  different  geographical  locations  as 
perceived by international depositors.  
Table 8 reports regressions of several measures of external non-bank exposures. 
First, regressions of non-bank external liabilities for the period 1983-1999 are reported in 
columns (1)-(2). The dependent variable in columns (3)-(4) is non-bank external deposits 
for the period 1996-1999, while it is share of non-bank deposits owned by the a country’s 
residents  held  abroad,  or  s,  in  columns  (5)-(6)  again  for  the  period  1996-1999.  The 
dependent variables as well as the control variables real GDP, bank interest spread and 
the two trade variables are in logs. Regressions (2), (4), and (6) include unreported bank 
and customer coutry dummies. Regressions (1), (3) and (5) instead include the rule of law 
and a set of dummy variables denoting the origin of a country’s legal system as controls. 
The bank interest spread serves as a measure of banking system efficiency. Systems with 
low  interest  spreads  are  expected  to  be  attractive  to  bank  customers  and  vice  versa. 
Several  estimated  coefficients  on  the  bank  interest  spread  variable  in  the  table  are 
statistically significant and consistent with this. The legal system variables are included 
following research by La Porta et al. (1997) showing that the outside equity and debt 
finance  raised  by  firms  depend  importantly  on  the  legal  system.  The  included  legal 
system variables in Table 8 denote legal systems of French, German and Scandinavian 
civil law origins – as opposed to the systems in the English common law tradition. The 
generally negative coefficients for these variables suggest that countries with non-English 
legal  traditions  participate  less  in  international  bank  depositing.  More  intense 
international trade, a smaller distance, geographical contiguity and a common language 
are expected to contribute to external bank liabilities. The estimated coefficients in the 
table largely confirm these expectations. 
  Turning to tax policy, the income tax x deposit rate variable is constructed as the 
customer-country income tax rate times its deposit interest rate (on the assumption that an 
individual depositing in his home country chooses the home currency). This tax variable 
obtains positive coefficients and significant coefficients in columns (1) and (2) (be it only 
at the 90 percent level in column (2)), but fails to be significant in other regressions. The   15
coefficient of 0.024 in column (2) suggests that  a 1 percent increase in the interest tax 
burden increases external bank liabilities by 2.4 percent. Next, the wealth tax variable 
simply is the wealth tax rate. This variable enters columns (3) a positive and significant 
coefficient but it is insignificant in the other columns. The final indicator of customer-
country  tax  policy  is  the  domestic  information  variable.  This  is  a  dummy  variable 
flagging  the  existence  of  automatic  interest  information  provisioning  to  domestic  tax 
authorities.  This  variable  enters  columns  (1)  and  (2)  with  positive  and  significant 
coefficients. The estimated coefficient of 0.248 in column (2) suggests that such domestic 
information provisioning increases external bank placements by 28 percent. As indicated 
at the bottom of the table, the estimation in columns (1) and (2) includes 7 episodes 
where  a  country  adopts  a  domestic  information  requirement.  During  the  1996-1999 
period underlying the regressions in columns (3)-(6) no such episode occurred.
16  
Next,  we  turn  to  bank-country  tax  policy.  Withholding  tax  x  deposit  rate  is 
constructed as the non-resident interest withholding tax levied by the bank country times 
this  country’s  deposit  interest  rate.  This  variable  thus  measures  the  withholding  tax 
burden the international bank customer faces in the bank country. The withholding tax 
variable  enters  most  regressions  in  the  table  with  negative  coefficients,  but  only 
significantly  in  columns  (1),  (3),  and  (5).  This  reflects  that  the  inclusion  of  country 
dummies suffices to render the coefficient on the withholding tax variable insignificant. 
This may reflect that most of the variation in the withholding tax rate is across bank 
country.
17 
A key result in Table 8 is that the interest income tax variable has a significantly 
positive  impact  on  external  liabilities  for  the  1983-1999  period,  but  not  on  external 
deposits for the 1996-1999 period. Most external liabilities in fact are external deposits, 
and hence the difference in the results appears to reflect the different time periods. To 
                                                           
16   This  explains  why  a  coefficient  for  the  domestic  information  variable  cannot  be  estimated  in 
regressions (4) and (6) where full sets of country dummies are included. 
17   The non-resident interest withholding tax presumably affects a saver’s choice of foreign bank 
location as much as the more fundamental choice of whether to bank abroad at all. Hence, estimated 
coefficients on the withholding tax variable may mostly reflect savers’ substitutions among various 
international banking destinations. Regressions with bilateral data thus cannot tell us directly how 
aggregate foreign banking would respond if all countries were to raise their withholding taxes (or 
alternatively were to exchange information).   16
further  investigate  this,  we  estimate  a  regression  based  on  column  (2)  in  Table  8 
including  the  four  policy  variables  interacted  with  a  time  dummy  for  the  1992-1999 
period.  The  non-interacted  income  tax  policy  variable  enters  with  a  positive  and 
statistically significant coefficient, while the interacted income tax variable has a negative 
coefficient  that  is  statistically  significant.  Together  these  results  suggest  that  interest 
income taxes mattered in the earlier period of 1983-1991, while the sensitivity of external 
deposits to interest income taxes declined from the earlier to the latter period (in fact, the 
relationship  between  external  deposits  and  the  income  tax  variable  is  statistically 
insignificant in the 1992-1999 period).  
This  is  surprising,  as  reduced  transportation  and  communication  costs  have 
generally  increased  international  capital  mobility.  One  reason  why  we  fail  to  find  a 
significant relationship between external deposits and interest income taxes from 1992 
may be that the interest income tax burden itself has become almost insignificant – due to 
declines  in  statutory  tax  rates  as  well  as  deposit  interest  rates  (see  Figure  1).  These 
declines probably were motivated by a perceived sensitivity of external liabilities to taxes 
in the 1980s, but policy makers may have ‘overshot’ to the point where the tax sensitivity 
is no longer material. Another possibility is that the relative importance of individual tax 
evaders, as holders of non-bank external liabilities, has declined. Holders of non-bank 
deposits  that  would  presumably  not  respond  to  personal  income  tax  changes  are 
corporations, governments, various non-bank tax-exempt financial institutions (such as 
mutual  funds  and  insurance  companies)  and  individuals  interested  in  keeping  funds 
abroad for a variety of non-tax reasons.  
Deposit owners in practice may need considerable time to adjust the geographical 
location  of  their  deposits  to  policy  changes.  To  see  whether  lagged  responses  are 
significant, we report a regression including lagged values for the four policy variables in 
column (2) of Table 9. These lagged policy variables fail to be statistically significant. 
Substituting the lagged values for the contemporaneous ones – as in column 3 – also 
produces lagged policy variables that are statistically insignificant.  Hence, there is no 
evidence that depositor response to policy changes is stretched out over more than a year. 
The income, wealth and non-resident withholding taxes considered in this paper 
apply to the interest receipts of individuals. Thus we naturally have considered how tax   17
policy changes affect non-bank external liabilities. The question arises, however, whether 
banks  adjust  their  other  external  lending  and  borrowing  following,  say,  an  increased 
inflow of non-bank external liabilities. The two main options are that banks hold more 
funds on deposit with international banks or, alternatively,  obtain fewer funds on deposit 
from international banks. The latter possibility suggests that external bank and non-bank 
deposits can be substitutes. To test this, we estimate a regression based on column (2) of 
Table 8 with external bank liabilities as the dependent variable. This leads to a coefficient 
on the wealth tax variable that is negative and statistically significant, as seen  in column 
(1) of Table 10. This is in line with the substitution hypothesis, as a higher wealth tax that 
encourages external non-bank deposits should discourage external bank deposits. Along 
similar lines, the ratio of non-bank to bank liabilities is expected to increase with those 
tax policy variables that encourage non-bank external depositing per se. A regression of 
this ratio, reported in column (2) of the table, yields positive and significant coefficients 
for all three customer country variables, i.e. the interest income tax variable, the wealth 
tax variable, and the domestic information variable.   
As discussed before, we have been able to collect information on the extent of 
bilateral  international  information  exchange  only  for  1999.  To  test  whether  this 
information  exchange  affects  external  liability  flows,  we  estimate  several  regressions 
with data only for 1999 as reported in Table 11. The first two columns in the table are for 
non-bank liabilities, while the remaining two are for non-bank deposits. The inclusion of 
full sets of bank and customer country dummies implies that only the bilateral policy 
variables (the withholding tax variable and the international information variable) and a 
set of bilateral controls can be included. As bilateral trade data tends to be available with 
a considerable lag, we find that including the two international trade variables leads to 
rather limited samples with 1999 data (as seen in columns (1) and (3)). Therefore, we 
also report regressions without these trade variables in columns (2) and (4). The two 
policy variables fail to be statistically significant in any of the regressions reported in 
Table 11. 
The  withholding  tax  variable  may  by  insignificant,  as  most  countries  have 
adopted zero withholding taxes by 1999. The international information variable further 
may not prove to be significant if the exchange of information, as currently organized,   18
fails  to  bring  about  an  effective  tax  enforcement.  At  the  same  time,  international 
information cannot have a noticeable effect, if savers by 1999 do not recognize that tax 
authorities  sometimes  ‘automatically’  swap  information  about  particular  international 
interest  payments.  Further,  international  information  exchange  was  far  from 
comprehensive  in  1999  so  that  savers  continued  to  have  access  to  ‘trusted’  foreign 
banking systems with strong reputations for bank secrecy. Continued access to this type 
of  foreign  banking  could  make  information  exchange  by  any  subset  of  countries 
ineffectual.      
 
4.  Conclusion 
  This paper has investigated the impact of tax policy on international depositing. 
The  empirical  results  indicate  that  non-bank  external  liabilities  have  been  positively 
related to interest income taxes and to the presence of domestic bank interest reporting. 
This is evidence that international deposits are in part intended to facilitate tax evasion. 
The sensitivity of international deposits to interest income taxes appears to have declined 
after  the  1980s.  This  may  reflect  that  the  interest  income  tax  burden  itself  has  been 
reduced  considerably  over  the  last  2  decades.  The  financial  wealth  tax  and  the  non-
resident interest withholding tax burden have similarly been diminished substantially.  
As interest withholding taxes have been reduced or eliminated, the international 
exchange  of  information  becomes  potentially  more  important  to  ensure  a  reasonable 
taxation  of  international  interest  flows.  A  simple  count  of  bilateral  international 
relationships reveals that by 1999 the automatic exchange of information is already as 
prominent  as  withholding  taxes.  However,  we  fail  to  find  a  significant  impact  of 
international  information  exchange  on  international  depositing  patterns.  This  justifies 
doubts about the effectiveness of international information exchange at present. For the 
instrument to become more effective, the quality of the information exchanged may need 
to be improved, for instance through the adoption of a common protocol regarding tax 
identification numbers. Also, the international exchange of information has to cover most 
industrialized countries and other financial centers to be truly effective. All this implies 
that  international  cooperation  in  this  area  is  necessary  to  shore  up  the  taxation  of 
international interest flows.   19
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Appendix A. Variable definitions and data sources. 
External bank liability and deposit data 
 
Data on external liabilities and deposits are for all currencies. In the regressions, non-
bank external liabilities and non-bank external deposits are in real ecus or euros and in 
logs. Other dependent variables in Tables 8 and 10 are in logs as well. Total deposits in 
the banking system in Table 2 are the sum of demand and other deposits (lines 24 and 25 
of the International financial statistics of the IMF). 
 
Taxation and bank information variables 
 
·  Income tax x deposit rate = income tax rate (between 0 and 100) times the deposit 
interest rate (between 0 and 1) in the bank customer country. The income tax is the 
final tax paid by residents (either the final withholding tax or the top marginal rate of 
the personal income tax). 
·  Wealth tax = wealth tax is the wealth tax applicable to financial assets (between 0 and 
100) 
·  Withholding tax x  deposit rate = non-resident interest  withholding tax on interest 
(between 0 and 100) times the deposit interest rate (between 0 and 1) in the bank 
country 
·  Domestic information = dummy signaling automatic reporting by banks of interest 
payments to domestic residents 
·  International  information  =  dummy  signaling  the  international  exchange  of 
information on bank interest payments 
 
The taxation variables are from various issues of  International tax summaries (Coopers 
&  Lybrand),  International  corporate  income  taxes,  a  worldwide  summary 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers),  and  the  European  tax  handbook  (International  Bureau  for 
Fiscal Documentation). Information on whether there recently has been domestic interest 
reporting by banks and any automatic exchange of information on international bank 
interest payments is taken from OECD (2000). Information on when automatic domestic 
reporting by banks started and to what countries and since when bank interest information 
is provided automatically (in Table 5) has been obtained from national authorities. The 




·  Real GDP = log of GDP in real ecus or euros 
·  Bank interest spread =  ratio of bank lending and deposit interest rates (in logs in 
regressions) 
·  Rule of law = assessment of law and order in a country. Average of the months of 
April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. On a scale from 0 to 
10 with lower scores for less law and order. The variable is an assessment of the 
strength and impartiality of the legal system and of popular observance of the law 
(see La Porta et al., 1997)   22
·  French law = dummy identifying French legal origin 
·  German law = dummy identifying German legal origin 
·  Scandinavian law = dummy identifying Scandinavian legal origin 
·  Bank country exports =  exports from bank country to customer country in real ecus 
or euros (in logs in regressions) 
·  Customer country exports =  exports from customer country to bank country in real 
ecus or euros (in logs in regressions) 
·  Distance =  distance in kilometers from capital to capital (in logs in regressions) 
·  Contiguity = dummy identifying a common border. 
·  Common  language  =  dummy  identifying  if  a  pair  of  countries  has  at  least  one 
common language. 
 
Data on GDPs and trade are from Eurostat and the IMF. The lending interest rates if from 
line 60p of the International financial statistics of the IMF. Information on rule of law 
and legal origin is from La Porta et al. (1997). Data on distance, contiguity, and common 
language are from WorldAtlas.com (2000) and Phensel (2000).   23
Table 1. External liabilities and deposits of banks in the BIS-area in 1999 
  
External liabilities  External deposits   
￿ bn  % non-bank  ￿ bn  % non-bank 
Australia  146  8  47  26 
Austria  80  12  65  15 
Bahamas  225  33  224  33 
Bahrain  82  31  82               31 
Belgium  272  31  261               28 
Canada  100  32  95  34 
Cayman Islands  604  42  597  43 
Denmark  56  15  46  18 
Finland  22  20  12  35 
France  611  9  472  12 
Germany  819  32  719  37 
Hong Kong  349  23  348  23 
Ireland  129  19  126  19 
Italy  233  7  232  7 
Japan  509  6  502  6 
Luxembourg  371  37  319  37 
Netherlands  288  18  240  22 
Norway  25  9  15  12 
Portugal  65  17  55  13 
Singapore  393  29  361  32 
Spain  184  39  177  40 
Sweden  72  13  53  10 
Switzerland  560  48  560  48 
United Kingdom  1,778  21  1,626  21 
United States  1,035  9  1,035  13 
Other  24  30  24  30 
         
Total  9,031  24  8,292  25 
 
Source: BIS (2000), Tables 2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B and own calculations   24
Table 2. Summary statistics on external deposits in 1998 
 







































Australia  16  18  6  3  203  207  3  -2 
Austria  37  43  6  6         
Bahamas  124  147  12  15         
Belgium  154  185  13  30         
Canada  45  75  14  15  317  316  4  0 
Denmark  33  36  3  5  86  84  3  3 
Finland  17  9  1  1  53  53  2  -1 
France  288  326  41  34         
Germany  337  494  87  97  1,267  1,257  7  1 
Ireland  58  91  19  19  57  57  33  0 
Italy  155  173  41  17  457  481  9  -5 
Japan  348  364  36  14         
Netherlands  254  202             
Norway  6  10  2  1  72  73  3  -1 
Portugal  29  30  5  5  87  87  6  0 
Spain  112  108  46  18  317  346  13  -8 
Sweden  31  57  4  12         
Switzerland  459  261  42  93  325  273  15  19 
United Kingdom  1,035  1,024  86  237         
United States  656  541  228  31  2,291  2,488  9  -8 
 
For data sources see Appendix A. Note that exports and imports are calculated using only data from those countries for which imports are available. 
   25 
Table 3. Summary statistics on external liabilities in 1998 
 












Australia  22  74  7  3 
Austria  38  45  6  6 
Bahamas  129  157  10  59 
Bahrain  25  35  2  3 
Belgium  157  200  13  41 
Canada  48  81  15  18 
Denmark  38  37  3  5 
Finland  17  9  1  1 
France  313  348  41  35 
Germany  352  512  89  97 
Hong Kong  258  294  23  14 
Ireland  59  92  19  19 
Italy  158  177  41  17 
Japan  653  545  40  15 
Netherlands  268  209     
Norway  7  10  2  1 
Portugal  29  40  5  8 
Singapore  216  251     
Spain  113  109  47  18 
Sweden  32  58  5  12 
Switzerland  463  277  42  98 
United Kingdom  1,129  1,098  97  243 
United States  709  572  234  34 
 
For data sources see Appendix A. Note that exports and imports are calculated using only data from 
those countries for which imports are available.   26 
Table 4. Wealth tax, interest income tax, and non-resident withholding tax for bank deposits in  
   1999. 
 
          Country  Income tax
18  Wealth tax  Withholding tax for non-residents 
Australia  47  0  10 
Austria  25  0  0 
Bahamas  0  0  0 
Bahrain  0  0  0 
Belgium  15  0  0 
Canada
19  48.75  0  0 
Cayman Islands  0  0  0 
Denmark
20  61.7  0  0 
Finland
21  28  0.9  0 
France 
22  25  1.8  0 
Germany
23  56.975  0  0 
Hong Kong  0  0  0 
Ireland  24  0  0 
Italy  27  0  0 
Japan
24  20  0  10/15 
Luxembourg  47.15  0.5  0 
Netherlands  60  0.7  0 
Netherlands Antilles  60  0  0 
Norway
25  28  1.1  0 
Portugal  20  0  10/12/15/20 
Singapore  28  0  0 
Spain
26  48  2.5  0 
Sweden  30  1.5  0 
Switzerland
27  41.4  0.713  0/5/10/12.5/35 
United Kingdom  40  0  0 
United States
28  39.6  0  0 
 
For data sources see Appendix A
                                                           
18   Final withholding tax or top marginal tax rate. 
19   Ontario. 
20   Copenhagen. Sum of basic rate, surcharges, and local and church taxes. 
21   Helsinki. 
22   Including social surcharge and generalized social tax. 
23   Including solidarity surcharge. 
24   Tokyo. Including local taxes. 
25   Sum of 0.4 percent national tax  plus 0.7 percent local tax. 
26   Including regional tax. 
27   Bern, including cantonal and municipal wealth tax. 
28   Federal tax only.   27 
Table 5. Domestic and international reporting of bank interest payments 
 
  Automatic reporting by banks 
on interest payments to 
domestic residents 
International automatic exchange of 
information on bank interest payments 
Country  Yes or no  If yes, since  To  Since 
Australia  Yes  88  Treaty partners  About 95 
Austria  No    None   
Belgium  No    None   
Canada  Yes    U.S at least   
Denmark
29  Yes  77  Differing countries  1993 
Finland
30  Yes  Over 20 years  Treaty partners (except 
Russia) 
Over 20 years 
France
31  Yes  84    94 
Germany  No    None   
Greece  No    None   
Ireland  Yes  92  None   
Italy  No    None   
Japan  Yes    Some countries   
Luxembourg  No    None   
Netherlands  Yes  87  None   
Norway  Yes  86  Treaty partners  More than 10 
years 
Portugal  No    None   
Spain  Yes  85  None   





France, Italy, Japan, 






Switzerland  No    None   
United Kingdom  Yes  52  Some countries   
United States  Yes    Canada  1997 
 
For data sources see Appendix A  
 
                                                           
29   In  1998  and  1999,  Denmark  provided  info  to  Australia,  Canada,  Czech  Republic,  Faeroe 
Islands, Finland, France,  Greenland, Hungary, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
UK, US. 
30   Main recipients have been Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Japan, 
New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, UK, US. 
31   In 1999, France provided information to Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, US.   28
 
Table 6. International automatic exchange of information on bank interest in 1999 
Receiving 
Country 














































































































































































































































Australia  X  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  1  1  1  1 
Austria  0  X  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Belgium  0  0  0  0  X  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Canada            X                                        1 
Denmark  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  X  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  1  1 
Finland  1  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  X  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
France  1  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  1  X  1  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  1  1 
Germany  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  X  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Greece   0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  x  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Ireland  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  X  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Italy  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  X  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Luxembourg  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  X     0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Netherlands  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  X  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Norway      0  0  1    0  1  1  1  1    0      1      0  X       1    1  1 
Portugal  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  X  0  0  0  0  0 
Spain  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  X  0  0  0  0 
Sweden  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  1  0  1  X  0  1  1 
Switzerland  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  X  0  0 
United States  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  X 
For data sources see Appendix A.    29 
Table 7. Summary statistics for 1999. 
Variable  #obs  Unit  Mean  Std. deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Country variables 
GDP  23  ￿ Bn  975.862  1873.174  6.212  8638.711 
Bank interest 
spread 
22    4.628  7.326  1.261  33.433
32 
Rule of law  20    9.228  1.066  6.180  10 
French law  22    0.318  0.477  0  1 
German law  22    0.182  0.395  0  1 
Scandinavian 
law 
22    0.182  0.395  0  1 
Income tax x 
deposit rate* 
23    0.938  0.874  0  3.166 
Wealth tax  26    0.374  0.675  0  2.500 
Domestic 
information 




286  ￿ Bn  5.055  15.479  0.000  192.366 
Customer 
country exports 
286  ￿ Bn  4.275  11.216  0.000  135.511 
Distance  702  Km  5942  4760  174  18,389 
Contiguity  702    0.071  0.257  0  1 
Language  702    0.185  0.389  0  1 
Withholding 
tax x deposit 
rate* 
575    0.040  0.115  0  0.480 
International 
information 
440    0.193  .0395  0  1 
Non-bank 
liabilities 
520  ￿ Bn  2.235  7.769  0.000  90.567 
Bank liabilities  520  ￿ Bn  8.669  23.155  0.000  182.108 
Non-bank 
deposits 
468  ￿ Bn  2.289  8.048  0.000  89.833 
Bank deposits  468  ￿ Bn  8.860  23.196  0.000  182.108 
* as percentage of principal. For data sources, see Appendix A 
                                                           
32   Ireland’s deposit rate was 0.10 percent and its loan rate was 3.34  percent in 1999.   30 
Table 8.  Determinants of external non-bank liabilities and deposits 
  Non-bank liabilities  Non-bank deposits  Non-bank deposits 
divided by ownership 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Bank country             
























Rule of law  .667** 
(.067) 
  .021 
(.104) 
  .134 
(.141) 
 
French law  -.249* 
(.116) 
  -.776** 
(.160) 
  -.927** 
(.216) 
 
German law  -.146 
(.128) 
  .193 
(.186) 
  -.272 
(.266) 
 
Scandinavian law  -2.719** 
(.138) 
  -2.309** 
(.193) 
  -2.729** 
(.249) 
 
Customer country             
























Rule of law  .139** 
(.045) 
  .085 
(.105) 
  -.311 
(.247) 
 
French law  -.988** 
(.097) 
  -1.233** 
(.203) 
  -2.172** 
(.389) 
 
German law  -.184 
(.142) 
  -.573 
(.324) 
  -1.483 
(.959) 
 
Scandinavian law  -2.285** 
(.116) 
  -2.469** 
(.210) 
  -2.526** 
(.305) 
 






























  -.041 
(.580) 
 
Relationship             










































































             
Adj. R²  .72  .84  .70  .83  .70  .83 
No. of obs  2375  2375  757  757  410  410 
No. changes in domestic 
information 
7  7  0  0  0  0 
Data on liabilities are for 1983-1999, while data on deposits is for 1996-1999. All regressions include 
unreported time dummies. Columns (2), (4) and (6) include bank and customer country dummies. The 
sample underlying columns (5) and (6) only includes data for those 18 countries for which we can 
compute both non-bank deposit exports and imports during the 1996-1999 period. Detailed variable 
definitions and data sources are given in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity consistent errors are given in 
parentheses. * and ** indicate significance levels of 5 and 1 percent, respectively.    31 
 
 
Table 9.  Determinants of external non-bank liabilities for different time periods 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Bank country non-policy variables       












Customer country non-policy variables       












Relationship non-policy variables       






























Policy variables       




















Income tax x deposit rate, 1992-1999  -.101* 
(.046) 
   
Wealth tax, 1992-1999  .069 
(.058) 
   
Domestic information, 1992-1999  -.125 
(.110) 
   
Withholding tax x  deposit rate, 1992-1999  .148 
(.131) 
   
















       
Adj. R²  .84  .84  .84 
No. of obs  2375  2213  2216 
No. changes in domestic information  7  6  6 
Data on liabilities are for 1983-1999. All regressions include unreported time and bank and customer 
country  dummies.  Detailed  variable  definitions  and  data  sources  are  given  in  Appendix  A. 
Heteroskedasticity consistent errors are given in parentheses. * and ** indicate significance levels of 5 
and 1 percent respectively.  
   32 
Table 10.  Determinants of external bank liabilities  
 
  Bank liabilities  Ratio of non-bank to bank 
liabilities 
  (1)  (2) 
Bank country     








Customer country     




















Relationship     
























     
Adj. R²  .87  .61 
No. of obs  2465  2371 
No. changes in domestic 
information  
7  7 
Data on liabilities is for 1983-1999. All regressions include unreported time dummies and bank and 
customer country dummies. Detailed variable definitions and data sources are given in Appendix A. 
Heteroskedasticity consistent errors are given in parentheses. * and ** indicate significance levels of 5 
and 1 percent, respectively.    33 
Table 11.  Determinants of non-bank liabilities and deposits in 1999 
 
  Non-bank liabilities  Non-bank 
deposits 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Exports  .298 
(.220) 
  .283 
(.697) 
 
Imports  .429 
(.222) 
  .468* 
(.221) 
 










































         
Adj. R²  .78  .74  .78  .73 
No. of obs.  112  203  112  203 
All regressions include unreported time dummies as well as unreported bank and customer country 
dummies. Detailed variable definitions and data sources are given in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity 
consistent errors are given in parentheses. * and ** indicate significance levels of 5 and 1 percent, 






































average interest income tax rate on residents (left-hand scale) Interest income tax burden (right-hand scale)  
 
 
Note. Non-weighted average for countries listed in Table 6. For data sources see Appendix A 
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Withholding tax rate on interest from bank deposits to non-residents (right-hand scale) withholding tax burden (left-hand scale)  
 
Note. Non-weighted average for countries listed in Table 6. The increase in the early 90’s is due to the 
introduction of a withholding tax in Greece and the extension of the Austrian withholding tax to a 
larger set of countries. The sharp decrease in 1997 and 1998 is mainly due to changes in the Greek and 
the Italian withholding tax rates. For data sources see Appendix A. 
 
 
 